Entity record

Ivan Vasiljevitj SPIRIDONOVPerson

Source-verifiedReflects EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions Listobserved not an issuing authority

Ivan Vasiljevitj SPIRIDONOV appears on the EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions List and 3 other official sanctions lists, designated by US OFAC, European Union, UK HM Treasury (OFSI), UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) under programs NPWMD, MAGNIT, CHEM, Chemical Weapons, The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019; reflected as observed on 2026-07-31.

Sanctions

Also known as

  • Ivan OSIPOV
  • Ivan SPIRIDONOV
  • Ivan Vasilyevich SPIRIDONOV
  • Иван Владимирович ОСИПОВ (Cyrl)
  • Иван Васильевич СПИРИДОНОВ (Cyrl)
  • Ivan Vasiljevitj SPIRIDONOV
  • Ivan Vladimirovitj OSIPOV
  • Ivan Spiridinov

Designations

Reason for listing

Per UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) (listed ):

UKSL CHW0020 — Measures: Asset freeze, Travel Ban, Director Disqualification Sanction — Ivan Osipov is an FSB operative in the Criminalistics Institute - Military Unit 34435. Evidence including phone and travel records suggest that Ivan Osipov was one of the operatives involved in the use of a chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny during his August 2020 visit to Siberia. A chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. Osipov was an operative of the Criminalistics Unit present in Tomsk where Navalny was poisoned. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Ivan Osipov, in his capacity as an operative in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, was present in Tomsk at the time of the poisoning and was one of the key operatives responsible for the preparation and use of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (official source)

Per UK HM Treasury (OFSI) (listed ):

CHW0020 — Ivan Osipov is an FSB operative in the Criminalistics Institute - Military Unit 34435. Evidence including phone and travel records suggest that Ivan Osipov was one of the operatives involved in the use of a chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny during his August 2020 visit to Siberia. A chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. Osipov was an operative of the Criminalistics Unit present in Tomsk where Navalny was poisoned. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Ivan Osipov, in his capacity as an operative in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, was present in Tomsk at the time of the poisoning and was one of the key operatives responsible for the preparation and use of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (official source)

Per US OFAC:

(Linked To: FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE) (official source)

Key properties

Date of birth
Place of birth
UNKNOWN
Nationality
Russia
Position
FSB Operative attached to Criminalistics Institute; agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) working as a Criminalistics Institute operative

Identifiers

Gender
Male
OFSI Group ID
14134
UK Sanctions List Unique ID
CHW0020

Addresses

Moscow, Russia

Linked to

The source record for this entity names these records as linked to it.

Relationships shown here reflect the named source's own fields (e.g. OFAC SDN remarks, OFSI parent/subsidiary fields) verbatim, joined to their listed records by exact name match. They are the issuing authority's statements, not an independent assertion by ProofAML.

Source list & list version

Source listList versionManifest SHA-256StatusVerify
EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions ListSanctions list
European Union (Council / DG FISMA)
20260612-00133df7d2e49ec829fList version (signing pending)manifest
UK Sanctions List (UKSL)Sanctions list
UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)
gb_fcdo_uksl@2026-08-046f5e8b8ed92cccf0List version (signing pending)
UK OFSI Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions TargetsSanctions list
UK HM Treasury — Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI)
20260610-0014d14d0d8a5584fffList version (signing pending)manifest
OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) ListSanctions list
US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control
20260613-001dbfaf0c020d646a9List version (signing pending)manifest

About these sources

The EU's Financial Sanctions Files (FSF) — the European Commission's consolidated feed of every person, group and entity subject to an EU asset freeze under Council CFSP decisions and their implementing Regulations (Russia/Ukraine, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and more).

What a match means: A match is an EU sanctions designation — funds and economic resources generally cannot be made available to this party under EU law; treat as a direct compliance hit.

The UK Sanctions List (UKSL), published by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office — since 28 January 2026 the single, current source for all UK sanctions designations (financial, immigration, trade and transport measures), superseding the older OFSI Consolidated List.

What a match means: A match is a current, binding UK sanctions designation — treat as a direct compliance hit and escalate immediately.

The UK's former OFSI Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets, maintained by HM Treasury. OFSI closed this list on 28 January 2026 — current UK sanctions designations now publish only to the FCDO UK Sanctions List (also in this catalog) — and it is retained here as a historical source.

What a match means: A match reflects a UK financial-sanctions designation recorded before the 28 Jan 2026 cutover; check whether the same party also appears on the current UK Sanctions List, and treat either appearance as a genuine UK sanctions hit, not a stale false positive.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List — the United States' primary sanctions list, naming persons, companies, vessels and aircraft whose property is blocked under US sanctions authorities (IEEPA, TWEA, the Kingpin Act, Global Magnitsky, and program-specific executive orders).

What a match means: A match is a direct US sanctions hit — the named party is designated and, absent a license, US persons are generally barred from dealing with them; escalate immediately rather than clearing the alert yourself.

First observed ; last confirmed present in EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions List list version 20260612-001, observed .

This page reflects the official EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions List, version 20260612-001, as observed on 2026-07-31. ProofAML is not the issuing authority.

Request a correction or dispute (distinguishes a data-handling error on our side from the underlying official designation, which is the issuing authority's record).

How to cite this page

Ivan Vasiljevitj SPIRIDONOV. ProofAML. This page reflects the official EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions List, version 20260612-001, as observed on 2026-07-31. ProofAML is not the issuing authority. URL: https://proofaml.com/people/ivan-vasiljevitj-spiridonov-nk189bb813/

Machine-readable export (FTM + lineage): /data/entities/18.json (record key nk189bb813)