Entity record
Ivan Vasiljevitc SPIRIDONOVPerson
Ivan Vasiljevitc SPIRIDONOV appears on the Australian Sanctions Consolidated List and 6 other official sanctions lists, designated by US OFAC, European Union, UK HM Treasury (OFSI), Global Affairs Canada (SEMA), FR DGT, AU DFAT, UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) under programs NPWMD, MAGNIT, CHEM, Chemical Weapons, Russia, Schedule 1, Part 1.1, (UE) 2022/2228 du 14/11/2022 (UE Lutte contre la prolifération des armes chimiques - R (UE) 2018/1542), Autonomous (Thematic - Human Rights), The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019; reflected as observed on 2026-09-04.
Also known as
- Ivan OSIPOV
- Ivan SPIRIDONOV
- Ivan Vasilyevich SPIRIDONOV
- Иван Владимирович ОСИПОВ (Cyrl)
- Иван Васильевич СПИРИДОНОВ (Cyrl)
- Ivan Vasiljevitj SPIRIDONOV
- Ivan Vladimirovitj OSIPOV
- Ivan Spiridinov
- Ivan Vasiljevitc SPIRIDONOV
Designations
- Designated by US OFAC under program NPWMD. Other entities under NPWMD
- Designated by US OFAC under program MAGNIT. Other entities under MAGNIT
- Designated by European Union under program CHEM since . Other entities under CHEM
- Designated by UK HM Treasury (OFSI) under program Chemical Weapons since . Other entities under Chemical Weapons
- Designated by Global Affairs Canada (SEMA) under program Russia since . Other entities under Russia
- Designated by Global Affairs Canada (SEMA) under program Schedule 1, Part 1.1 since . Other entities under Schedule 1, Part 1.1
- Designated by FR DGT under program (UE) 2022/2228 du 14/11/2022 (UE Lutte contre la prolifération des armes chimiques - R (UE) 2018/1542) since . Other entities under (UE) 2022/2228 du 14/11/2022 (UE Lutte contre la prolifération des armes chimiques - R (UE) 2018/1542)
- Designated by AU DFAT under program Autonomous (Thematic - Human Rights) since . Other entities under Autonomous (Thematic - Human Rights)
- Designated by UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) under program The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 since . Other entities under The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019
Reason for listing
Per AU DFAT (listed ):
Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons—Thematic Sanctions) Amendment (No. 1) Instrument 2022 (official source)
Per FR DGT (listed ):
Ivan Osipov est un agent du Service fédéral de sécurité russe (FSB) travaillant en tant qu’agent de l’Institut de criminalistique. À ce titre, il a directement participé aux préparatifs et à l’exécution de l’empoisonnement d’Alexeï Navalny au moyen d’un agent neurotoxique de type Novitchok à Tomsk le 20 août 2020, empoisonnement qui constitue une utilisation d’armes chimiques au sens de la convention sur les armes chimiques. Par conséquent, Ivan Osipov était impliqué dans les préparatifs en vue d’utiliser des armes chimiques ainsi que dans l’emploi d’armes chimiques. (official source)
Per Global Affairs Canada (SEMA) (listed ):
SEMA Schedule 1, Part 1.1, Item 29 (official source)
Per UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) (listed ):
UKSL CHW0020 — Measures: Asset freeze, Travel Ban, Director Disqualification Sanction — Ivan Osipov is an FSB operative in the Criminalistics Institute - Military Unit 34435. Evidence including phone and travel records suggest that Ivan Osipov was one of the operatives involved in the use of a chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny during his August 2020 visit to Siberia. A chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. Osipov was an operative of the Criminalistics Unit present in Tomsk where Navalny was poisoned. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Ivan Osipov, in his capacity as an operative in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, was present in Tomsk at the time of the poisoning and was one of the key operatives responsible for the preparation and use of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (official source)
Per UK HM Treasury (OFSI) (listed ):
CHW0020 — Ivan Osipov is an FSB operative in the Criminalistics Institute - Military Unit 34435. Evidence including phone and travel records suggest that Ivan Osipov was one of the operatives involved in the use of a chemical weapon in the attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny during his August 2020 visit to Siberia. A chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. Osipov was an operative of the Criminalistics Unit present in Tomsk where Navalny was poisoned. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny is a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Ivan Osipov, in his capacity as an operative in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, was present in Tomsk at the time of the poisoning and was one of the key operatives responsible for the preparation and use of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (official source)
Per US OFAC:
(Linked To: FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE) (official source)
Key properties
- Date of birth
- Place of birth
- Russia; UNKNOWN
- Nationality
- Russia
- Position
- Agent du Service fédéral de sécurité russe (FSB); FSB Operative attached to Criminalistics Institute; agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) working as a Criminalistics Institute operative
- Country
- RUSSIA
- Gender
- male
- Notes
- Ivan Osipov est un agent du Service fédéral de sécurité russe (FSB) travaillant en tant qu’agent de l’Institut de criminalistique. À ce titre, il a directement participé aux préparatifs et à l’exécution de l’empoisonnement d’Alexeï Navalny au moyen d’un agent neurotoxique de type Novitchok à Tomsk le 20 août 2020, empoisonnement qui constitue une utilisation d’armes chimiques au sens de la convention sur les armes chimiques. Par conséquent, Ivan Osipov était impliqué dans les préparatifs en vue d’utiliser des armes chimiques ainsi que dans l’emploi d’armes chimiques.
Identifiers
- Gender
- Male
- OFSI Group ID
- 14134
- UK Sanctions List Unique ID
- CHW0020
Addresses
Moscow, RussiaOwnership & control links
Linked to
Relationships reflect the issuing authority's own statements (OFAC “Linked To” remarks, UK OFSI parent/subsidiary fields, UK Sanctions List / OFSI ship-owner fields), joined to listed records by exact name match — not an independent assertion by ProofAML.
Related entities
Linked to
The source record for this entity names these records as linked to it.
Relationships shown here reflect the named source's own fields (e.g. OFAC SDN remarks, OFSI parent/subsidiary fields) verbatim, joined to their listed records by exact name match. They are the issuing authority's statements, not an independent assertion by ProofAML.
Source list & list version
| Source list | List version | Manifest SHA-256 | Status | Verify |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australian Sanctions Consolidated ListSanctions list Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade | au_dfat_sanctions@2026-09-04 | 3391750c53486121… | List version (signing pending) | — |
| Canada Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List (SEMA)Sanctions list Global Affairs Canada | ca_dfatd_sema_sanctions@2026-08-13 | fc57c0c9c99bc1a9… | List version (signing pending) | — |
| EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions ListSanctions list European Union (Council / DG FISMA) | 20260612-001 | 0c83e632fea7709d… | List version (signing pending) | manifest |
| Registre national des gelsSanctions list Direction générale du Trésor | fr_tresor_gels_avoir@2026-09-03T11:52:46.0865293+02:00 | befdb75f35011f00… | List version (signing pending) | — |
| UK Sanctions List (UKSL)Sanctions list UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) | gb_fcdo_uksl@2026-09-02 | a775be210dce0de9… | List version (signing pending) | — |
| UK OFSI Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions TargetsSanctions list UK HM Treasury — Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) | 20260610-001 | 4d14d0d8a5584fff… | List version (signing pending) | manifest |
| OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) ListSanctions list US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control | 20260613-001 | f72eae9992417510… | List version (signing pending) | manifest |
About these sources
Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade administrative Consolidated List — UN and Australian autonomous sanctions entries, including individuals, entities and sanctioned vessels, with measure indicators and designation instruments. The underlying instruments and law control, and a consolidated list can lag an amendment.
What a match means: A match is an entry on Australia's official operational list. Escalate it as a genuine sanctions signal, then check the published measure flags and cited controlling instrument before deciding the legal restriction.
Canada's Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List, maintained by Global Affairs Canada as an administrative convenience list of persons under the Special Economic Measures Act and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act. It does not cover all United Nations Act regulations or Criminal Code terrorist entities, and the underlying law controls.
What a match means: A match is an entry on Global Affairs Canada's official administrative list. The list has no force of law and may lag amendments, so review the cited regime and operative regulation before deciding the legal restriction; escalate it as a genuine screening signal rather than treating the list entry itself as the binding instrument.
The EU's Financial Sanctions Files (FSF) — the European Commission's administrative consolidated feed of persons, groups and entities subject to EU asset-freeze measures under Council CFSP decisions and implementing Regulations. The underlying legal acts control and a consolidated feed can lag an amendment.
What a match means: A match is an entry in the Commission's official operational feed. Escalate it as a genuine EU sanctions signal, then verify the cited programme and controlling Council Regulation before deciding the exact legal restriction.
France's Registre national des gels, published by the Direction générale du Trésor — the administrative national operational register combining EU, UN-implemented and French domestic asset-freeze measures while retaining each legal basis. The cited legal acts control and the consolidated register can lag an amendment.
What a match means: A match is an entry in France's official asset-freeze register. Preserve its French/EU/UN provenance and escalate it, then review each attached legal basis and effective date before deciding the controlling obligation.
The UK Sanctions List (UKSL), published by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office — since 28 January 2026 the single, current source for all UK sanctions designations (financial, immigration, trade and transport measures), superseding the older OFSI Consolidated List.
What a match means: A match is a current, binding UK sanctions designation — treat as a direct compliance hit and escalate immediately.
The UK's former OFSI Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets, maintained by HM Treasury. OFSI closed this list on 28 January 2026 — current UK sanctions designations now publish only to the FCDO UK Sanctions List (also in this catalog) — and it is retained here as a historical source.
What a match means: A match reflects a UK financial-sanctions designation recorded before the 28 Jan 2026 cutover; check whether the same party also appears on the current UK Sanctions List, and treat either appearance as a genuine UK sanctions hit, not a stale false positive.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List — the United States' primary sanctions list, naming persons, companies, vessels and aircraft whose property is blocked under US sanctions authorities (IEEPA, TWEA, the Kingpin Act, Global Magnitsky, and program-specific executive orders).
What a match means: A match is a direct US sanctions hit — the named party is designated and, absent a license, US persons are generally barred from dealing with them; escalate immediately rather than clearing the alert yourself.
First observed ; last confirmed present in Australian Sanctions Consolidated List list version au_dfat_sanctions@2026-09-04, observed .
This page reflects the official Australian Sanctions Consolidated List, version au_dfat_sanctions@2026-09-04, as observed on 2026-09-04. ProofAML is not the issuing authority.
Request a correction or dispute (distinguishes a data-handling error on our side from the underlying official designation, which is the issuing authority's record).
How to cite this page
Ivan Vasiljevitc SPIRIDONOV. ProofAML. This page reflects the official Australian Sanctions Consolidated List, version au_dfat_sanctions@2026-09-04, as observed on 2026-09-04. ProofAML is not the issuing authority. URL: https://proofaml.com/people/ivan-vasiljevitc-spiridonov-nk189bb813/
Machine-readable export (FTM + lineage): /data/entities/18.json (record key nk189bb813)
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